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No information flow using statistical fluctuations, and quantum cryptography
Jan-A˚ke Larsson
Matematiska Institutionen, Linko¨pings Universitet, SE-581 83 Linko¨ping, Sweden
The communication protocol of Home and Whitaker [Phys. Rev. A 67, 022306 (2003)] is examined in some
detail, and found to work equally well using a separable state. The protocol is in fact completely classical, based
on simple post-selection of suitable experimental runs. The quantum cryptography protocol proposed in the
same publication is also examined, and is found to indeed need quantum properties for the system to be secure.
However, the security test proposed in the mentioned paper is found to be insufficient, and a modification is
proposed here that will ensure security.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Information transfer using quantum entanglement is a sub-
ject of great interest presently. Quantum teleportation [1, 2,
3, 4] is one of the more prominent applications, although
it has caused some debate about what is teleported or not
[5, 6], and on the relation to nonlocality and inseparability
[7, 8, 9, 10, 11]. Since quantum entanglement is one of the
important resources in quantum information theory, the inter-
est in these issues is not surprising. One application is that
of quantum computers which would have a big impact on our
world when/if one is actually built. One more immediate ap-
plication is quantum cryptography [12, 13, 14], and one pro-
posal of a quantum-cryptographic protocol will be discussed
below.
First we will look at a quantum communication setup pre-
sented in [15], that uses the experimental setup but not the
communication protocol of the quantum teleportation exper-
iment. The protocol of [15] (to be described briefly below)
is intended to communicate apparatus settings from Alice to
Bob without transmitting the settings on the classical channel
that connects Alice and Bob. This procedure is then extended
in [15] to make a quantum cryptography protocol. Here, these
two will be critically examined in order.
The communication protocol is as follows: Alice and Bob
share one half each of many copies of a maximally entangled
2-part spin- 12 state indexed 2 and 3, and Alice has an addi-
tional particle at her disposal indexed 1, so that the total state
is
|Ψ123〉=
(
a |↑1〉+ b |↓1〉
) 1√
2
( |↑2↓3〉− |↓2↑3〉
)
, (1)
using the obvious notation for eigenstates of szn (and we will
denote the measurement results Szn below). The coefficients a
and b are chosen to be real here, so that a2 + b2 = 1. Should
one want to use complex coefficients, each occurrence of a2
and b2 below should be exchanged for |a|2 and |b|2, respec-
tively. An alternative way to write the state is
|Ψ123〉= 12
{∣∣Ψ+12
〉(− a |↑3〉+ b |↓3〉
)
+
∣∣Ψ−12
〉(− a |↑3〉− b |↓3〉
)
+
∣∣Φ+12
〉(− b |↑3〉+ a |↓3〉
)
+
∣∣Φ−12
〉(
+ b |↑3〉+ a |↓3〉
)}
,
(2)
where we have used the Bell basis
∣∣Ψ+12
〉
= 1√2
( |↑1↓2〉+ |↓1↑2〉
)
∣∣Ψ−12
〉
= 1√2
( |↑1↓2〉− |↓1↑2〉
)
∣∣Φ+12
〉
= 1√2
( |↑1↑2〉+ |↓1↓2〉
)
∣∣Φ−12
〉
= 1√2
( |↑1↑2〉− |↓1↓2〉
)
.
(3)
Each run of the protocol uses four of these trios as follows.
Alice performs either (a) four Bell-state measurements on
her two particles 1 and 2 or (b) four measurements of Sz1 and
Sz2. In either case, if Alice should happen to get different
measurement results on her side in all four measurements [de-
noted “criterion Q” in Ref. [15]], she announces “OK” to Bob
on the classical channel. Bob, on the other hand, always per-
forms four measurements of Sz3 and calculates the sum Sz3t of
these results. If he received “OK” on the classical channel, the
two possibilities of settings at Alice give different probability
distributions of Sz3t.
If Alice’s setting was (a), Bob has the probability a2 of get-
ting +h¯ for two of the four particles in the group, and the
probability b2 of getting +h¯ for the other two particles. This
is easily seen in Eq. (2), and implies the following for the
probability distribution of the sum,
P(Sz3t = 2h¯) = P(Sz3t =−2h¯) = a4b4
P(Sz3t = h¯) = P(Sz3t =−h¯) = 2a2b2(a4 + b4) (4)
P(Sz3t = 0) = a8 + 4a4b4 + b8.
Looking at expectation values, we see that
〈Sz3t〉= 0; 〈S2z3t〉= 4h¯2a2b2, (5)
where the latter is zero only if a or b is zero.
If Alice’s setting was (b) instead, inspection in Eq. (1)
shows that Bob will get two each of “up” and “down”, or in
other words that
P(Sz3t = 2h¯) = P(Sz3t = h¯) = P(Sz3t =−h¯)
= P(Sz3t =−2h¯) = 0; P(Sz3t = 0) = 1,
(6)
so
〈Sz3t〉= 0; 〈S2z3t〉= 0. (7)
2Bob now checks if the value of Sz3t he received is zero or
nonzero. In the case his measured sum is nonzero he knows
with certainty that Alice’s setting was (a), in the ideal case,
since it is obvious in Eq. (6) that nonzero values only occur
for setting (a). If the measured sum is zero, the situation is
different. We have
P
(
Sz3t = 0
∣∣∣setting (b)
)
= 1, (8)
while
P
(
Sz3t = 0
∣∣∣setting (a)
)
= a8 + 4a4b4 + b8. (9)
To distinguish the setting (a) from the setting (b), one wants
the error probability in Eq. (9) to be as small as possible. It
is minimized if a = b = 1/
√
2, for which it is 3/8 = 0.375.
If the protocol is modified to use 4N triads rather than four,
this probability can be made arbitrarily small. The proto-
col will indeed indicate to Bob which setting Alice has used,
even though the “OK” that Alice sent on the classical channel
seems to have nothing to do with the setting she chose.
II. A SEPARABLE-STATE IMPLEMENTATION
It is noted in Ref. [15] that maximal entanglement is not
necessary for this scheme, but it is argued that entanglement
does play a role. Let us look at this claim closer. Suppose that
the state used is not that of Eq. (1)) but the separable mixed
state
ρ123 =
(
a2 |↑1〉〈↑1|+ b2 |↓1〉 〈↓1|
)
⊗ 12
( |↑2↓3〉〈↑2↓3|+ |↓2↑3〉〈↓2↑3|
)
.
(10)
Rewriting this in the Bell basis yields the expression
ρ123 = 14
[(∣∣Ψ+12
〉〈
Ψ+12
∣∣+ ∣∣Ψ−12
〉〈
Ψ−12
∣∣)
⊗ (a2 |↑3〉〈↑3|+ b2 |↓3〉 〈↓3|
)
+
(∣∣Φ+12
〉〈
Φ+12
∣∣+ ∣∣Φ−12
〉〈
Φ−12
∣∣)
⊗ (b2 |↑3〉〈↑3|+ a2 |↓3〉 〈↓3|
)]
+ 14
[(∣∣Ψ+12
〉〈
Ψ−12
∣∣+ ∣∣Ψ−12
〉〈
Ψ+12
∣∣)
⊗ (a2 |↑3〉〈↑3|− b2 |↓3〉 〈↓3|
)
− (∣∣Φ+12
〉〈
Φ−12
∣∣+ ∣∣Φ−12
〉〈
Φ+12
∣∣)
⊗ (b2 |↑3〉〈↑3|− a2 |↓3〉 〈↓3|
)]
,
(11)
where the first parenthesis contains the diagonal elements.
The question now is what happens when using the above pro-
tocol on ρ123. Let us assume that Alice has received four dif-
ferent measurement results [criterion Q] and announced “OK”
on the classical channel.
If Alice’s setting was (a), Bob has the probability a2 of get-
ting +h¯ for two of the four particles in the group, and the
probability b2 of getting +h¯ for the other two particles. This
is easily seen in Eq. (11), from this follows that the probability
distribution of the sum is
P(Sz3t = 2h¯) = P(Sz3t =−2h¯) = a4b4
P(Sz3t = h¯) = P(Sz3t =−h¯) = 2a2b2(a4 + b4) (12)
P(Sz3t = 0) = a8 + 4a4b4 + b8.
Looking at expectation values, we see that
〈Sz3t〉= 0; 〈S2z3t〉= 4h¯2a2b2, (13)
where the latter is zero only if a or b is zero.
If Alice’s setting was (b) instead, inspection in Eq. (10)
shows that
P(Sz3t = 2h¯) = P(Sz3t = h¯) = P(Sz3t =−h¯)
= P(Sz3t =−2h¯) = 0; P(Sz3t = 0) = 1,
(14)
so
〈Sz3t〉= 0; 〈S2z3t〉= 0. (15)
This is exactly the same as Eqs. (4)–(7), so the conclusion is
the same. There is another way to see this because, with a and
b possibly complex,
|Ψ123〉 〈Ψ123|=
(
a |↑1〉+ b |↓1〉
)(
a¯〈↑1|+ ¯b〈↓1|
)
⊗ 12
( |↑2↓3〉− |↓2↑3〉
)(〈↑2↓3|− 〈↓2↑3|
)
= ρ123−
(
a |↑1〉+ b |↓1〉
)(
a¯〈↑1|+ ¯b〈↓1|
)
⊗ 12
( |↑2↓3〉〈↓2↑3|+ |↓2↑3〉 〈↑2↓3|
)
+
(
a¯b |↑1〉〈↓1|+ a¯b |↓1〉〈↑1|
)
⊗ 12
( |↑2↓3〉〈↑2↓3|− |↓2↑3〉 〈↓2↑3|
)
.
(16)
Note that the last two terms are off-diagonal only. Writing
|Ψ123〉 〈Ψ123| in the Bell basis on particles 1 and 2 will yield a
full matrix in the density representation, consisting of 64 ele-
ments. Let us not write that large expression here, but simply
note that
|Ψ123〉〈Ψ123|= 14
[( ∣∣Ψ+12
〉〈
Ψ+12
∣∣+ ∣∣Ψ−12
〉〈
Ψ−12
∣∣)
⊗ (a2 |↑3〉 〈↑3|+ b2 |↓3〉〈↓3|
)
+
(∣∣Φ+12
〉〈
Φ+12
∣∣+ ∣∣Φ−12
〉〈
Φ−12
∣∣)
⊗ (a2 |↓3〉 〈↓3|+ b2 |↑3〉〈↑3|
)]
+
[
off-diagonal terms
]
=ρ123 +
[
off-diagonal terms
]
.
(17)
So, it is clear from Eq. (17) that for (a) Bell-state measure-
ments at Alice and Sz3 measurements at Bob, the two states
will yield the same statistics. Similarly, it is clear from
Eq. (16) that for (b) measurements of Szn at Alice and Bob,
the two states will yield the same statistics. The densities have
equal diagonal elements in both expansions, and are therefore
impossible to distinguish if Alice and Bob are only allowed to
3use measurements (a) or (b), and measurement of Sz3, respec-
tively. A discussion of the role of the off-diagonal elements
in regular quantum teleportation can be found in Ref. [5]. Of
course, the off-diagonal elements will play a role if Alice and
Bob are allowed other measurements than the ones singled out
above. Especially, only allowing Bob measurements of Sz3 is
a severe restriction, but we will investigate this further in Sec-
tion IV below.
However, for the proposed protocol, the separable mixed
state ρ123 will produce the same results as |Ψ123〉 〈Ψ123|. In
fact, the protocol does not use any specifically quantum prop-
erties of the system, it uses classical postselection to obtain
the desired statistics. Postselection is known to sometimes
give unexpected results (see, e.g., [16]).
III. A COIN-TOSS IMPLEMENTATION
It is not difficult to implement this protocol using a number
of classical unbiased and biased coin tosses. To make it look
like the above setup, we will use three coins c1, c2 and c3 that
are divided so that Alice can read off the results from coins c1
and c2 while Bob can read the result of coin c3.
Coin c1 is biased so that
P(c1 =+1) = a2; P(c1 =−1) = b2, (18)
where we have used +1 to denote “heads” and −1 to denote
“tails”. Coin c2 is fair, i.e.,
P(c2 =+1) = 12 ; P(c2 =−1) = 12 , (19)
and coin c3 always gives the opposite result to coin c2. This
can be implemented using one coin toss at the “source of the
c2-c3 pair,” communicating the result to Alice, and the oppo-
site result to Bob, both on a classical channel. In addition, we
will need a fair coin c4 that Alice will use in case (a) below.
An important comment to make is that the coins c1, c2, and c4
should be independent.
The protocol proceeds as above, with groups of four tosses
of the coins c1–c4. A “measurement” consists of reading off
the result of a coin toss. Alice reads either (a) four results of
c4 and the product c1c2 [which, in a way, corresponds to the
Bell-state measurement used previously], or (b) four results of
c1 and c2. In either case, if Alice should happen to get four
different results on her side [criterion Q], she announces “OK”
to Bob on the classical channel. Bob, on the other hand, al-
ways reads off c3, and calculates the sum c3t of the results. If
he received “OK” on the classical channel, the two possibili-
ties of settings at Alice give different conditional probability
distributions of c3t.
The case when Alice used setting (b) is trivial, since Bob
will receive two each of +1 and −1, so the probability distri-
bution reads
P(c3t = 2) = P(c3t = 1) = P(c3t =−1)
= P(c3t =−2) = 0; P(c3t = 0) = 1,
(20)
and the classical expectations are
E(c3t) = 0; E(c23t) = 0. (21)
The case when Alice’s setting was (a) is a more complicated
and, for clarity, let us do the calculation explicitly. Since the
coins c1 and c2 are independent and c2 is fair,
P(c1c2 =−1) = 12 , (22)
and since c3 =−c2 we have
P(c3 =−1∩ c1c2 =− 1) = P(c2 =+1∩ c1 =−1)
= P(c2 =+1)P(c1 =−1) = 12 b2.
(23)
Thus
P(c3 =−1|c1c2 =−1) = P(c3 =−1∩ c1c2 =−1)P(c1c2 =−1) = b
2,
(24a)
and from that follows
P(c3 =+1|c1c2 =−1) = a2. (24b)
From a similar calculation we obtain
P(c3 =−1|c1c2 =+1) = a2,
P(c3 =+1|c1c2 =+1) = b2.
(25)
An “OK” from Alice means that the result of c1c2 was +1
twice and −1 twice. This implies that the probability distribu-
tion of the sum c3t must be
P(c3t = 2) = P(c3t =−2) = a4b4
P(c3t = 1) = P(c3t =−1) = 2a2b2(a4 + b4) (26)
P(c3t = 0) = a8 + 4a4b4 + b8.
Looking at expectation values, we see that
E(c3t) = 0; E(c23t) = 4a2b2, (27)
where the latter is zero only if a or b is zero.
This is the same statistics as obtained before (modulo the
measurement-result labels ±h¯), so this completely classical
scheme implements the protocol just as well as the previous
two quantum systems.
IV. QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
The second issue in [15] is to provide a quantum cryptog-
raphy protocol based on the above procedure. As is usual,
Alice and Bob are assumed to have an open but unjammable
classical channel to communicate on, and a quantum channel
that in this case consists of the common source emitting par-
ticles 2 and 3. Alice has two random sequences of bits, one
that provides the raw key to be transmitted to Bob over the
quantum channel, and another that decides the encoding to be
used. Bob has a third random bit sequence that decides the
decoding he will use.
Note that the described use of three different random bit
sequences is very similar to the BB84 [12] protocol. The dif-
ference is that the present setup uses a source of entangled
pairs of qubits, much as in Ekert quantum cryptography [13]
4but, as we will see shortly, without the Bell inequality test.
Another difference is the usage of several pairs of qubits for
transmission of a bit in the key, as described below.
For each bit with the value 1 in the raw key Alice makes (a)
4N Bell-state measurements, and for each bit with the value
0 she uses the encoding bit-sequence to determine which to
perform of (b) 4N measurements of Sz1 and Sz2, or (c) 4N
measurements of Sx1 and Sx2. Bob, who knows nothing of
Alice’s two bit sequences, uses his decoding bit sequence to
determine which to perform of (b’) 4N measurements of Sz3
or (c’) 4N measurements of Sx3.
Given that Alice receives the four possible results N times
each [criterion Q], she announces the encoding to Bob (but
not the key bit), i.e., which setting of (b) or (c) she used. If
she happened to use setting (a), the encoding bit will make
her announce one of (b) or (c) to Bob, randomly with equal
probability. This means that Alice transmits the encoding bit
to Bob, but not the raw key bit; she does not transmit any
information about the raw key over the classical channel.
Bob discards data where his setting was (b’) and Alice an-
nounced (c), and where his setting was (c’) and Alice an-
nounced (b). For the remaining runs, when he used setting
(b’) he can determine whether Alice’s setting was (a) or (b) by
the earlier protocol, and similarly when he used setting (c’) he
can determine whether Alice’s setting was (a) or (c). He can
now determine the bits of the raw key for the experimental
runs that remain after the above filtering. He also communi-
cates which runs he is using to Alice, but neither the settings
nor the resulting bit. The remaining bit sequence (the sifted
key) will now be equal at Alice and Bob, or at least as equal
as possible, see below. They have established a key to use in
their cryptographic scheme.
There will be some noise in the sifted key even in the ideal
case, because Bob cannot with certainty say, for example,
whether Alice used (a) or (b). If Bob receives a nonzero result
in his measurement of Sz3t, he knows that Alice’s setting was
(a) but if Bob receives a zero result, the probability that Alice
used setting (b) is larger than 12 but there is a nonzero proba-
bility that the setting was (a). This probability will depend on
a, b and N and tend to zero as N tends to infinity. In a real
implementation one has to choose N finite, otherwise the key
rate will be zero. For example, when a = b and N = 1,
Table 1
Normal operation: P(OK) = 664
Alice’s bit Bob’s bit Probability
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 38
1 1 58
The visible effect will be that some ones in Alice’s bit-
sequence will arrive as the value zero at Bob. In the ideal
case, no zeros will become one, so evidently, Bob’s copy of
the sifted key will have slightly more zeros than Alice’s copy.
Comparing this cryptographic scheme with the previously
described communication scheme, the set of possible mea-
surement setups is extended so that the off-diagonal terms in
the expansion of |Ψ123〉 〈Ψ123| come into play, making that
particular state or another entangled state a requirement for
the quantum cryptography scheme. And the whole idea of
quantum cryptography is to use specifically quantum proper-
ties of a system in such a way that eavesdropping always will
be detectable. It is noted in Ref. [15] that if |Ψ123〉 〈Ψ123| is
used, and the eavesdropper Eve makes 4N measurements of
either Sz3 or Sx3 at random, she will be detected. In the case
a = b and N = 1, we have
Table 2
Eve is listening: P(OK) = 664
Alice’s bit Eve’s basis Bob’s bit Probability
0 correct 0 1
0 correct 1 0
0 incorrect 0 38
0 incorrect 1 58
0 (mean) 0 1116
0 (mean) 1 516
1 either 0 38
1 either 1 58
Apparently, there will be extra noise, but only in the zeros. In
comparison to the BB84 protocol, the situation is as follows:
Table 3
BB84 HW[15]
Alice’s bit Eve is P(error) P(error)
0 absent 0 0
1 absent 0 38
0 present 14
5
16
1 present 14
3
8
The performance of BB84 is better than the protocol of
Home and Whitaker [15] when Eve is absent, while the figures
are comparable when Eve is present. Of course, the protocol
of [15] uses more qubits per sifted key bit than BB84. Both
protocols will reject half the data outright (when the “settings”
disagree at Alice and Bob), but in addition, the protocol of
[15] uses four qubits for each raw key bit and of these only
6/64 will yield a bit in the sifted key, that is, when Alice an-
nounces “OK” on the classical channel. Also there is another
problem, which we will turn to now.
V. A COHERENT ATTACK
If the source is in an insecure location, or if Eve has access
to both the quantum channel going from the source to Alice
and that going to Bob, she can replace the source with her
own. Eve can of course replace the source emitting the entan-
gled state with a source randomly emitting either 4N copies
of the mixed state
1
2
( |↑z2↓z3〉〈↑z2↓z3|+ |↓z2↑z3〉 〈↓z2↑z3|
)
, (28a)
5or 4N copies of
1
2
( |↑x2↓x3〉〈↑x2↓x3|+ |↓x2↑x3〉〈↓x2↑x3|
)
, (28b)
but that would yield the same statistics as that obtained when
Eve is simply eavesdropping on (one of) the quantum chan-
nels. And then, Alice and Bob can use a statistical test to
detect Eve’s precense.
Eve can do something more clever than transmitting 4N
copies of a mixed state, but let us now restrict ourselves to
the case N = 1 and a = b for simplicity. Note that Eve has
complete freedom of choosing what state to send to Alice and
Bob, including what sequence of states to send. She can for
instance choose to send the sequence
|↑z2↓z3〉〈↑z2↓z3| , |↑z2↓z3〉〈↑z2↓z3| ,
|↓z2↑z3〉〈↓z2↑z3| , |↓z2↑z3〉〈↓z2↑z3| ,
(29)
which would yield a key bit of zero at Bob if Bob uses the (b’)
setting: measurement of Sz3tot; in the above sequence, the sum
of the received spins is zero. At Alice, the sequence will yield
“OK” if Alice uses the (b) setting. In a different notation, Eve
will have sent the state
|Cz2〉=
∣∣↑1z2↑2z2↓3z2↓4z2
〉 (30)
to Alice (the upper index on the right-hand side denotes the
timeslot, and in hexadecimal C16 = 11002 perhaps with the
name “qunybble” [17]), and
|3z3〉=
∣∣↓1z3↓2z3↑3z3↑4z3
〉 (31)
to Bob. Obviously, this state is only good if Alice and Bob
do not use (c) and (c’). If they do, the probability of “OK”
at Alice is 6/64 since the results will be random at Alice, and
there will be some noise in the “transmitted” key bit at Bob,
since the measurement results will be random there as well.
But Eve has one more ace up her sleeve: entanglement.
Note that
|3z3〉+ |Cz3〉=12
[(
|0x3〉+ |Fx3〉
)
+
(
|3x3〉+ |Cx3〉
)
−
(
|5x3〉+ |Ax3〉
)
−
(
|9x3〉+ |6x3〉
)]
,
(32a)
|5z3〉+ |Az3〉=12
[(
|0x3〉+ |Fx3〉
)
−
(
|3x3〉+ |Cx3〉
)
+
(
|5x3〉+ |Ax3〉
)
−
(
|9x3〉+ |6x3〉
)]
,
(32b)
and
|9z3〉+ |6z3〉=12
[(
|0x3〉+ |Fx3〉
)
−
(
|3x3〉+ |Cx3〉
)
−
(
|5x3〉+ |Ax3〉
)
+
(
|9x3〉+ |6x3〉
)]
.
(32c)
Letting q = exp(2ipi/3), Eve can choose to transmit the state∣∣ψ3,00
〉
, given by
√
6
∣∣ψ3,00
〉
=
(
|3z3〉+ |Cz3〉
)
+ q
(
|5z3〉+ |Az3〉
)
+ q2
(
|9z3〉+ |6z3〉
)
=
(
|3x3〉+ |Cx3〉
)
+ q
(
|5x3〉+ |Ax3〉
)
+ q2
(
|9x3〉+ |6x3〉
)
,
(33)
for which the result of measuring either of the sum Sz3tot and
the sum Sx3tot is zero. The above is an entangled state, but the
entanglement is in the sequence of particles emitted to Bob
instead of the pairwise entanglement between particles 2 and
3 in the original source. Bob will always receive the mea-
surement result zero, irrespective if his setting is (b’) or (c’);
this particular source is “tuned” for zeros. In addition, if Eve
transmits the same state to Alice, or rather the corresponding∣∣ψ2,00
〉
, Alice will have a higher chance of getting “OK” if she
uses the setting (b) or (c), since the results at particle 2 will be
two of “up” and two “down”. The probability of getting “OK”
is then 14 (or 16/64) rather than the usual 6/64. We have
Table 4
Eve tunes the source for zeros
Alice’s bit P(OK) Bob’s bit Probability
0 1664 0 1
0 1664 1 0
1 664 0 1
1 664 1 0
Eve cannot use this source only, since only zeros would
be transmitted (correctly) to Bob. But Eve can also tune the
source to produce ones; note that
|0z3〉− |Fz3〉=12
[(
|1x3〉+ |Ex3〉
)
+
(
|2x3〉+ |Dx3〉
)
+
(
|4x3〉+ |Bx3〉
)
+
(
|8x3〉+ |7x3〉
)]
,
(34)
while
|1z3〉− |Ez3〉=12
[
−
(
|1x3〉− |Ex3〉
)
+
(
|2x3〉− |Dx3〉
)
+
(
|4x3〉− |Bx3〉
)
+
(
|8x3〉− |7x3〉
)]
,
(35a)
|2z3〉− |Dz3〉=12
[(
|1x3〉− |Ex3〉
)
−
(
|2x3〉− |Dx3〉
)
+
(
|4x3〉− |Bx3〉
)
+
(
|8x3〉− |7x3〉
)]
,
(35b)
|4z3〉− |Bz3〉=12
[(
|1x3〉− |Ex3〉
)
+
(
|2x3〉− |Dx3〉
)
−
(
|4x3〉− |Bx3〉
)
+
(
|8x3〉− |7x3〉
)]
,
(35c)
6and
|8z3〉− |7z3〉=12
[(
|1x3〉− |Ex3〉
)
+
(
|2x3〉− |Dx3〉
)
+
(
|4x3〉− |Bx3〉
)
−
(
|8x3〉− |7x3〉
)]
.
(35d)
So Eve could use the state |ψ3,11〉, where
√
10
∣∣ψ3,11
〉
=
(
|0z3〉− |Fz3〉
)
+ q
(
|1z3〉+ |2z3〉+ |4z3〉+ |8z3〉
)
+ q2
(
|Ez3〉+ |Dz3〉+ |Bz3〉+ |6z3〉
)
=
(
|0z2〉− |Fz2〉
)
+ q
(
|1z2〉+ |2z2〉+ |4z2〉+ |8z2〉
)
+ q2
(
|Ez2〉+ |Dz2〉+ |Bz2〉+ |6z2〉
)
,
(36)
for which the relevant probabilities are
Table 5
Eve tunes the source for ones
Alice’s bit P(OK) Bob’s bit Probability
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 664 0 0
1 664 1 1
Eve does not want to change the ratio of ones to zeros in
the transmitted key from that of the raw key, since that would
enable a statistical test for her presence. The rate of OK’s
should be 6/64 irrespective of whether Alice has a 0 or a 1 in
her raw key. This will be achieved by letting Eve’s source be
tuned for zeros with a probability of 6/16, and be tuned for
ones with a probability of 10/16. In quantum language, Eve
would tune the source to send
3
8
∣∣ψ2,00ψ3,00
〉〈
ψ2,00ψ3,00
∣∣+ 58
∣∣ψ2,11ψ3,11
〉〈
ψ2,11ψ3,11
∣∣.
(37)
Remarkably, this is the same ratio as is required to make the 16
different bit combinations of the four particles equally prob-
able, something also desired by Eve, because otherwise, e.g.,
Bob could test the statistical properties of his unfiltered data
to detect Eve. With this ratio, the probability of “OK” is
P
(
OK
∣∣∣Raw key bit is 0
)
= 616 · 1664 + 1016 ·0 = 664 (38a)
and
P
(
OK
∣∣∣Raw key bit is 1
)
= 616 · 664 + 1016 · 664 = 664 (38b)
Zeros are transferred only when the source is tuned for zeros,
which also means that there will be no errors in the zeros, in
the ideal case. However, ones will be “transferred” both when
the source is tuned for ones (no errors in the ideal case) and
when the source is tuned for zeros (all errors in the ideal case).
With the above weighting, the rate of errors in the ones will
be
P
(
Bob gets a 0
∣∣∣OK , Raw key bit is 1
)
= 616 ·1+ 1016 ·0 = 38
(39)
We arrive at
Table 6
Eve tunes the source: P(OK) = 664
Alice’s bit Bob’s bit Probability
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 38
1 1 58
This table is identical to Table 1, “Normal operation.” Eve is
controlling the source, and she knows what values Bob will
recieve when Alice announces “OK” on the classical channel.
She has, quite surprisingly, used entanglement to her benefit
for a coherent attack on the four qubits making up a single
key bit value. The errors occur exactly like in the case Eve is
absent.
VI. THE PERFECT ILLUSION?
So Eve has a way to eavesdrop unnoticed on Alice and Bob,
at least if the security test used is the one proposed in Sec-
tion IV, estimating the error rate in the sifted key. But note
that with the above tuned source, if Alice receives a spin sum
is equal to zero, Bob will also receive a spin sum equal to
zero, regardless of the setting they use. And (provided they
have read this paper) Alice and Bob will by now know to test
this in their system. Is this then enough?
Let us see if Eve can construct a system that obeys the fol-
lowing:
(i) Eve can eavesdrop, or alternatively, control the source
so that she knows in advance what the results should be
for both measurement settings
(ii) if Alice gets spin-sum zero at one setting, then Bob also
should get spin-sum zero at the same setting
(iii) the spin-sum at one setting at Bob is statistically inde-
pendent of the spin-sum at the other setting at Alice,
and vice versa
(iv) the 16 different local results are equally probable at ei-
ther setting
It takes some calculation to determine a state with these
desired properties (desired by Eve, that is), but one such state
7is
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64
∣∣ψ2,00ψ3,00
〉〈
ψ2,00ψ3,00
∣∣
+ 564
∣∣α2,01α3,01
〉〈
α2,01α3,01
∣∣+ 564
∣∣α ′2,10α ′3,10
〉〈
α ′2,10α
′
3,10
∣∣
+ 564
∣∣β2,01β3,01〉〈β2,01β3,01
∣∣+ 564
∣∣β ′2,10β ′3,10
〉〈β ′2,10β ′3,10
∣∣
+ 564
∣∣γ2,01γ3,01
〉〈
γ2,01γ3,01
∣∣+ 564
∣∣γ ′2,10γ ′3,10
〉〈
γ ′2,10γ ′3,10
∣∣
+ 864
∣∣χ2,11χ3,11
〉〈
χ2,11χ3,11
∣∣+ 864
∣∣χ ′2,11χ ′3,11
〉〈
χ ′2,11χ ′3,11
∣∣
+ 964
∣∣φ2,11φ3,11
〉〈φ2,11φ3,11
∣∣.
(40)
Here, the first index of the pure states in the pure-state ex-
pansion is the particle index as used before, and the later two
indices indicate which bit value the particular state is tuned
for, in the bases (b) and (c), in order. The included states are∣∣ψ3,00
〉
as defined in Eq. (33), and
|α3,01〉= 1√2
(
|3z3〉− |Cz3〉
)
=
1
2
√
2
[
−
(
|1x3〉− |Ex3〉
)
−
(
|2x3〉− |Dx3〉
)
+
(
|4x3〉− |Bx3〉
)
+
(
|8x3〉− |7x3〉
)]
,
(41a)
|β3,01〉= 1√2
(
|5z3〉− |Az3〉
)
=
1
2
√
2
[
−
(
|1x3〉− |Ex3〉
)
+
(
|2x3〉− |Dx3〉
)
−
(
|4x3〉− |Bx3〉
)
+
(
|8x3〉− |7x3〉
)]
,
(41b)
|γ3,01〉= 1√2
(
|9z3〉− |6z3〉
)
=
1
2
√
2
[
−
(
|1x3〉− |Ex3〉
)
+
(
|2x3〉− |Dx3〉
)
+
(
|4x3〉− |Bx3〉
)
−
(
|8x3〉− |7x3〉
)]
,
(41c)
together with their “mirrored” counterparts
∣∣α ′3,10
〉
=
1
2
√
2
[
−
(
|1z3〉− |Ez3〉
)
−
(
|2z3〉− |Dz3〉
)
+
(
|4z3〉− |Bz3〉
)
+
(
|8z3〉− |7z3〉
)]
=
1√
2
(
|3x3〉− |Cx3〉
)
,
(42a)
.
.
. .
We also need the state
|χ3,01〉= 1√2
(
|0z3〉− |Fz3〉
)
=
1
2
√
2
[(
|1x3〉+ |Ex3〉
)
+
(
|2x3〉+ |Dx3〉
)
+
(
|4x3〉+ |Bx3〉
)
+
(
|8x3〉+ |7x3〉
)]
,
(43)
mirrored in the same way, and finally,
|φ3,11〉= 12√2
[(
|1z3〉− |Ez3〉
)
+
(
|2z3〉− |Dz3〉
)
+
(
|4z3〉− |Bz3〉
)
+
(
|8z3〉− |7z3〉
)]
=
1
2
√
2
[(
|1x3〉− |Ex3〉
)
+
(
|2x3〉− |Dx3〉
)
+
(
|4x3〉− |Bx3〉
)
+
(
|8x3〉− |7x3〉
)]
.
(44)
Each of these states show the same properties as the states that
were used in Section V, given that Alice and Bob use the same
settings, but show different behaviour when they use different
settings. For example, if Eve sends |β2,01β3,01〉 and Alice and
Bob both use the (b) setting (or Alice (a) and Bob (b)), the
results will follow Table 4 because this state is tuned for zeros
in this basis. If Alice and Bob both use the (c) setting (or
Alice (a) and Bob (c)), the results will follow Table 5 because
this state is tuned for ones in this basis. If they use different
settings, the spin sum will differ at the two sites.
The statistics obtained from the state in Eq. (40) follows the
behaviour of the original state exactly, as far as the spin sums
are concerned, and Table 6 gives the key-transmission errors.
The existence of this state shows that only checking the key
bits, or indeed, checking statistical properties of the spin sums
at the two sites at any combination of the two settings, will
not provide any security.
Is the illusion perfect, then? Not at all. For example, if the
spin sum is one of the extreme values at one site, e.g., a result
of 0z2 or Fz2, there will be no occurrences of spin sum zero
at the other site at the other setting, i.e., none of 3x3, 5x3, 6x3,
9x3, Ax3, and Cx3 will occur. Simply put, this is because there
is no possibility to make
|0z3〉+ |Fz3〉= c1
(
|3x3〉+ |Cx3〉
)
+ c2
(
|5x3〉+ |Ax3〉
)
+ c3
(
|9x3〉+ |6x3〉
) (45)
in fact,
|0z3〉+ |Fz3〉=12
[(
|0x3〉+ |Fx3〉
)
+
(
|3x3〉+ |Cx3〉
)
+
(
|5x3〉+ |Ax3〉
)
+
(
|9x3〉+ |6x3〉
)]
.
(46)
In other words, there is no possibility to combine the value 0
or F in one basis (and no spin sum zero results there) with only
spin sum zero in the other. And this property of the quantum
state space together with requirements (i)–(iv) makes it im-
possible for Eve to combine an extreme spin sum result at one
site at one setting with a spin sum zero at the other site at the
other setting.
Thus, Alice and Bob absolutely must augment their test for
noise in the key with a
Test to see whether the full local results at one
setting is independent of the spin sum at the re-
mote site at the other setting.
8Testing independence of the spin sums at different settings
is not enough. I would perhaps go so far as conjecturing that
the protocol would be secure given the mentioned two tests
(and a test that the local results occur with equal probability),
but I would not really recommend using them as tests of se-
curity of the protocol. There are two reasons for this: they
would provide a relatively weak statistical test, since the test
cases occur quite rarely; but a more important reason is that
the tests are complicated to motivate, and it would perhaps be
difficult to convince a potential user that it ensures security,
even if it may be possible to present a formal security proof.
The lesson from this is instead that one needs to analyze the
full local data set together with information from the remote
site. Since this is necessary, one may as well choose a much
simpler and more easily motivated security test that does re-
spect this structure:
Test the individual qubits at the two sites. That is,
test whether the local results at one setting is the
same as the remote results at the same setting.
This test would provide the kind of security intended in
[15], and would fail if Eve uses the kind of source described
above.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The communication protocol proposed in [15] does clearly
not use any specifically quantum properties of the quantum
teleportation setup. In particular it does not need an entan-
gled state since a separable state performs equally well. The
system is using classical postselection of appropriate experi-
mental runs to transfer the data. One could have hoped that the
quantum properties of the quantum system of either Section I
or II would enhance Bob’s chance of distinguishing Alice’s
setting (a) from (b), but this is not the case, since the protocol
shows the same performance using the purely classical system
of Section III.
As to the quantum-cryptographic protocol of [15], the us-
age of several qubits to transmit a single key bit is problem-
atic. Simply testing for noise in the sifted key is not suffi-
cient in this quantum-cryptographic scheme, because Eve can
use entanglement to her benefit, to eavesdrop without being
noticed. In Section VI we noted that an additional test was
needed; a test for independence of the remote spin sum with
the full local result. But a simpler test was also suggested; to
test whether the remote qubit results are identical to the local
qubit results if the same setting is used at the two sites.
Of course, Eve will have a difficult time establishing the
entangled mixed state needed for eavesdropping when Alice
and Bob use the originally proposed test. But this is more a
technological issue; the above reasoning is talking about the
protocol as being (in)secure in principle, just as [15] is talking
about the protocol as being usable in principle.
Since it is necessary to test the individual qubits to obtain
a secure system, the protocol does seem wasteful because it
only uses entanglement present in groups of 4N qubits for key
transmission. Also, when Alice’s raw key bit is 1, no entan-
glement at all is used, since the behaviour of the protocol in
this situation is derived from the fact that Bob’s results are
statistically independent from Alice’s. Many runs will also be
discarded because Alice will send “OK” quite seldom, since
criterion Q (see Section IV) will be fulfilled with probability
only 664 .
In all, little of the available entanglement is put to good
use, even when the qubits are individually tested, since the
sifted key is derived from a joint result of several qubit mea-
surements. Entanglement is a valuable resource, and should
be used with care. In conlusion, while these protocols are
theoretically interesting, they are probably not very useful in
practice.
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